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ABS~RACT 
There are many beha~iors that have been observed with Cockpit 
Alerting and Warning Systems (CAWS). We know that pilots ignore 
alerts from a CAWS with high false alarm rate; pilots come to 
rely on the CAWS as a primary system instead of a backup system; 
pilots miss alerts during periods of high workload; pilots adopt 
"unusual" criteria when evaluating alerts; pilots confuse one 
alert with another; and pilots turn off or otherwise defeat CAWS 
systems. 
This paper presents an analysis of the effectiveness of an alert-
ing system with a single alert. The pilot's decision behavior is 
modeled by the Theory of Signal Detection and therefore accounts 
for different ·strengths· of cross-check information and dif-
ferent pilot criteria. The model includes the' effects of the 
CAWS error rate; the pilot's past experience with the CAWS accu-
racy; his reliance on 'the CAWS rather than independent, monitor-
ing; missed alerts (due to high workload or other reasons); and 
adoption of a minimum error or Neyman-Pearson objective rather 
than minimum cost objective. , (The model does not account for a 
pilot turning off the CAWS or confusing one alert with another.) 
Exercising the model in a sensitivity analysis shows, among other 
things, that for rare events (a) the expected cost is greatly in-
creased if the pilot ignores the a posteriori information in the 
existence of an alert; (b) the expected cost is insensitive to 
'CAWS Type I (missed event) errors; and (c) the expected cost is 
sensitive to CAWS Type II (false alarm) errors only when the 
cross-check information is ambiguous. 
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